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Radiological Source
A hazard classification (Huang 1999) previously prepared for the FSS facility led to the conclusion that the FSS should be declared a Nuclear Facility with a Moderate Hazard Class rating. The analysis and results contained in the hazard classification can be used to provide additional information to support other safety analysis documentation. Also, the hazard classification provides analyses of the toxicological hazards inherent with the FSS inventory; whereas, a hazard categorization prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92 considers only the radiological component of the inventory.
BACKGROUND
The FSS facility, consisting of various buildings formerly used for fuel fabrication, laboratories, concretion (mixing uranium fines and sludge with masonry cement), incinerating uranium and Zircaloy-2 fines, uranium special nuclear material storage, and offices (see Table 1 .1) is located in the northeast comer of the 300 Area on the Hanford Site. Fuel fabrication, laboratories, concretion, and incinerator operations have been completely shutdown. The FSS facility is now used to store uranium billets, assembled and partially assembled fuel elements and scrap, canned uranium oxide and thorium oxide powder, and pelletized and sintered uranium oxide sealed within welded tubing, and is also used for office space. The FSS facility is currently undergoing transition activities required for turnover to the Environmental Restoration Contractor (ERC) for eventual decontamination and decommissioning (D&D).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A final hazard classification has been prepared for the FSS facility in accordance with DOE-STD-1027 -92 (DOE 1992 . For the uranium metal fuel storage buildings, the final hazard classification was prepared based on the unmitigated consequences of the most severe credible accident, i.e., an unmitigated fire in the 3712 Building that is used to store 675 MTU. These buildings are assigned a hazard classification of Category 3, since the radionuclide inventory is greater than Category 3 TQs, but the inventory at risk is less than the Category 2 TQs.
The radionuclide inventory of the building used to store residual uranium oxide and thorium oxide powders is less than the Category 3 TQs, resulting in its classification as Radiological. The remaining buildings have insufficient radionuclide inventory to designate them as Radiological and also have insufficient other hazardous substances to classify them as Non-Nuclear, which results in them being classified as Industrial. Table 1 .2 summarizes the classification of each building based on the current operational status or planned usage. 98.67 wt% z38U (3.5 E-01 Ci); and I O ppm 99Tc for 1 Metric Ton Uranium 0 (Johnson 1994 ). The 3712 Building was initially analyzed as containing a radiological inventory of 1122 MTU available for release from a single building, based on the "worst case" accident (Huang 1999) . However, the 3712 Building currently contains less than 675 MTU. Table 2 .1 describes the basis radionuclide quantities for the 3712 Building. This inventory is also considered to be the basis for determining the inventory at risk for the FSS facility. Facility segmentation is permitted by DOE-STD-1027-92, as long as the hazardous material in one segment (or building) cannot interact with the hazardous material in other segments (or buildings). Since the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), and piping systems are independent among the various fuel storage buildings (i.e,, there are no W A C or process piping systems in these buildings that could allow hazardous material interaction) and there is a physical separation between the buildings, independence is demonstrated for facility segmentation purposes. Other buildings, with lesser inventory capacities, are also considered for hazard classification, as identified in Section 3.0.
Uranium-234 Mandigo 1996 Since the inventory of at least one of the isotopes exceeds a Category 3 TQ, the 3712 Building is at least Category 3.
Uranium-234 Uranium-235 Uranium-236 Uranium-238 Technetium-99
Examination of the nominal inventories of the other fuel storage buildings shows that the minimum quantity is 52 MTU in the 303-B Building. Although this inventory is slightly less than 8% of the 3712 Building inventory, it is noted that the U-234 activity exceeds the Category 3 TQ by a factor of about 7. Thus, even the 303-B fuel storage building is at least Category 3.
Next, the 3712 Building inventory was compared to Category 2 TQs (Table A. 1, DOE 1992 and HNF-PRO-704), for individual radionuclides as shown in Table 3 .2. Since one of the radionuclides exceeds the Category 2 TQs, this would initially classif)-the 3712 Building as a Category 2 Nuclear Facility.
FINAL HAZARD CLASSIFICATION
In developing a final hazard classification, the DOE-STD-1027-92 standard allows for facilities initially classified as Hazard Category 2 to use the material at risk (MAR) associated with the unmitigated bounding accident. This method is used to classify the uranium storage buildings.
MATERIAL AT RISK
The final hazard classification determination was calculated using the credible MAR associated with the bounding uranium storage building fire.
Johnson 1994 reviewed existing uranium oxidation experimental data to predict billet oxidation during the postulated uranium storage building fire. Subsequent review of that study has led to the conclusion that the predicted oxidation rates were overly conservative. For example, after estimating the time for a uranium billet to oxidize completely at the predicted peak temperature, it was assumed that the storage building fire was at that peak temperature the entire time instead of ramping up to that temperature and then cooling down once the combustible material was consumed. Furthermore, that oxidation time was then reduced by about 20%.
Re-examination of the 3712 building fire time-temperature profile (the ASTM standard time-temperature curve obtained from the Fire Protection Handbook) based on the combustible material loading shows that the temperature quickly reaches about 800°C in less than 30 minutes and then rises more slowly to reach 1000°C within 2 hours. Because extrapolation of the oxidation experiments indicates that billet oxidation would occur in approximately 170 hours at both 800OC and about 1000°C (Johnson 1994) , that time is used to represent oxidation behavior up to 1000°C. Based on the fire temperature being at or above 1000°C from 2 hours to 4.5 hours, the oxidation time associated with the peak temperature (1093°C.), Le., 124 hours (Johnson 1994) , is assigned to that time period. M e r 4.5 hours, the fire cools to 300°C in another 3.5 hours. Although no oxidation behavior for the lower temperature range was indicated in the references cited in the accident analysis (Johnson 1994 ), a 200-hour oxidation period is conservatively applied to represent that temperature range because the oxidation rate is temperature dependent. Because of the mass of uranium associated with the postulated fire, it is believed that buildup of oxide "ash would inhibit the oxidation process somewhat. Thus the fraction of billets oxidized during the fire would be conservatively represented by 2 hr/170 hr + 2.5 hr/124 hr + 3.5 hr/200 hr = 0.0494
Treating oxidation of the clad fuel as though it were unclad billets is conservatively valid because a) the Zircaloy-2 cladding forms a protective adherent oxide coating that resists hrther oxidation (Johnson 1994) , and b) although the ends of the unfinished fuel stored in the 3716 Building have no cladding, all fuel components are substantially longer than the diameter of the billets. Although Zircaloy-2 is designed primarily for nuclear reactor components, its oxidation resistance has been reported to be such that after approximately 100 hours in air at 6S0°C, an adherent protective coating measuring up to 300pm thick is formed (Sinha, et al 1987) . Table B -I, footnote (a).
RADIONUCLIDE
As shown in Table 4 .1, the quantities of individual radionuclides associated with the MAR are less than Category 2 TQs and the sum of fractions of the isotopic MAR quantity to the Category 2 TQ ratio is less than 1 (0.17 < 1). Thus, the 3712 Building hazard classification is Category 3 Nuclear Facility.
Since each of the remaining uranium fuel storage buildings has already been shown to be at least Category 3 and each has less inventory than the 3712 Building (which has just been demonstrated to be Category 3), then these buildings are also Category 3. Thus the 303-4 303-B, 303-G, and 3716 Buildings are Category 3. The radionuclide inventory associated with the low-level contamination on the fuel elements in 303-A and 303-B is insignificant compared to the fuel itself
OTHER BUILDING HAZARD CLASSIFICATIONS
303-K/3707-G BUILDING
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 contain the quantities ofthe individual isotopes for the 303-W3707-G Building. This building contains 2.192 MT depleted uranium, 1.27 MT natural uranium, and 0.470 MT Th (Appendix A). All these materials are in oxide form, either as sintered pellets or as powders. This inventory is considered to be the material at risk for the building. The uranium in this building is not the same uranium used for N Reactor fuel fabrication. Rather, it is a combination of natural uranium and depleted uranium that was associated with FFTF fbel and blanket assembly fabrication. Because each radionuclide is less than the Category 3 TQ and the sum of fractions of the TQs is less than unity, the 303-W3707-G is not a Nuclear Facility, per DOE-STD-1027-92.
RADIONUCLIDE COMPOSITION
HNF-PRO-704, Hazard and Accident AnaZysis Process, summarizes hazardous material inventory thresholds from DOE-EM-STD-5 502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation (DOE 1994) , to guide the facility classification process. When the radiological threshold quantity (TQ) is less than the Hazard Category 3 TQ, but above the 40 CFR 302, Table 302 .4, Appendix B reportable quantities (RQ), the facility is classified as Radiological. Table 5 .4 compares the 303-W3707-G radiological source term with the appropriate RQs from 40 CFR 302. Table 302 .4, results in this facility being classified as a "low-hazard radiological" facility per HNF-PRO-704 since neither of these CFRs include uranium or thorium oxides in their listings of RQs. 2 303-E, 303-F, 333,304,303-M, 313-S, 334,334-A and MO-052 
5.
Buildings
Each of these buildings has much less than the Nuclear Facility Category 3 threshold . quantity of radionuclides, which corresponds to approximately 4 MT of the FSS uranium. Table  5 5 summarizes these building contents. Non-Nuclear and Industrial facility radioactive material inventories are less than Table 302 .4, Appendix B RQs, with the Non-Nuclear status assigned to facilities which possess RQs of nonradioactive hazardous substances. Industrial facilities have neither radioactive material nor hazardous substance in excess of RQs.
Comparison of the activities corresponding to the 303-M radionuclide inventory (40 kg) (DOE 1996) with the RQs of 40 CFR 302, Table 302 .4, Appendix B is shown in Table 5 .6 below: Since each of the radionuclides is less than their RQ and the sum of fractions is less than unity (0.40 < I), the 303-M radionuclide content is less than the threshold for a Radiological facility. Inspection of Table 5 .5 shows that no other facility has significant radionuclide inventory.
The other test is to compare the hazardous, non-radioactive substances with the RQs from 40 CFR 302, Table 302 .4. There are no residual materials in the process equipment or stored materials that have RQs. Inspection of all these buildings has shown that no RQ of hazardous materials exists. Thus, all of these buildings are classified as Industrial facilities.
Anticipated Hazard Classification Reductions
